The symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues extend the notion of binomial semivalue to games with a coalition structure, in such a way that they generalize the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value. By considering the property of balanced contributions within unions, two axiomatic characterizations for each one of these values are provided.
Introduction
Games with a coalition structure were first considered by Aumann and Drèze [2] , who extended the Shapley value to this new framework in such a manner that the game really splits into subgames played by the unions isolatedly from each other, and every player receives the payoff allocated to him by the Shapley value in the subgame he is playing within his union. A second approach was used by Owen [7] , when introducing and axiomatically characterizing his coalitional value (Owen value) . In this case, the unions play a quotient game among themselves, and each one receives a payoff which, in turn, is shared among its players in an internal game. Both payoffs, in the quotient game for unions and within each union for its players, are given by the Shapley value.
By applying a similar procedure to the Banzhaf value, Owen [8] got a second coalitional value, the modified Banzhaf value for games with a coalition structure or Owen-Banzhaf value. In this case the payoffs at both levels, that of the unions in the quotient game and that of the players within each union, are given by the Banzhaf value.
Alonso and Fiestras [1] realized that the Owen-Banzhaf value fails to satisfy two interesting properties of the Owen value: symmetry in the quotient game and the quotient game property. Then they suggested to modify the two-step allocation scheme and use the Banzhaf value for sharing in the quotient game and the Shapley value within unions. This gave rise to the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value.
The notion of p-binomial semivalue was first given by Puente [9] . Carreras and Puente [3] extended this notion to games with a coalition structure and obtained at the same time a wide generalization of the Alonso and Fiestras value (essentially: p ∈ [0, 1] instead of p = 1/2), the family of symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalues.
Our aim here is to provide two axiomatic characterizations for each symmetric coalitional binomial semivalue, both based on the interesting property of balanced contributions within unions. First we use it jointly with additivity, the dummy player property, symmetry in the quotient game and the coalitional p-binomial total power property. Next, we prove that the symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue is the unique coalitional value of the p-binomial semivalue that satisfies balanced contributions within unions and the quotient game property.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, a minimum of preliminaries is provided. In Section 3 we recall the definition of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues, introduce the property of balanced contributions within unions and state and prove the characterization theorems.
Preliminaries

Games and semivalues
Let N be a finite set of players and 2 N be the set of its coalitions (subsets of N ). A cooperative game on N is a function v :
Endowed with the natural operations for real-valued functions, the set of all cooperative games on N is a vector space G N . For every nonempty coalition T ⊆ N , the unanimity game u T is defined by u T (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and u T (S) = 0 otherwise. Finally, every permutation θ of N induces a linear automorphism of G N given by (θv)(S) = v(θ −1 S) for all S ⊆ N and all v. By a value on G N we will mean a map f :
Following Weber's [12] axiomatic description, ψ : G N → R N is a semivalue iff it satisfies the following properties:
(ii) anonymity:
There is an interesting characterization of semivalues, by means of weighting coefficients, due to Dubey, Neyman and Weber [4] . Set n = |N |. Then: (a) for every
where s = |S|, defines a semivalue ψ; (b) conversely, every semivalue can be obtained in this way; (c) the correspondence given by {p k } n−1 k=0 → ψ is bijective. Well known examples of semivalues are the Shapley value ϕ (Shapley [10] ), for which p k = 1/n n−1 k , and the Banzhaf value β (Owen [6] ), for which p k = 2 1−n . The Shapley value ϕ is the only efficient semivalue, in the sense that
Notice that these two classical values are defined for each N . The same happens with the binomial semivalues, introduced by Puente [9] as follows. Let p ∈ [0, 1] and
k=0 is a weighting vector and defines a semivalue that will be denoted as ψ p and called the p-binomial semivalue. Of course, ψ 1/2 = β.
Games with a coalition structure
Let us consider a finite set, say, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We will denote by P (N ) the set of all partitions of N . Each P ∈ P (N ) is called a coalition structure or system of unions on N . The so-called trivial coalition structures are P n = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}} and P N = {N }. A cooperative game with a coalition structure is a pair [v; P ], where v ∈ G N and P ∈ P (N ) for a given N . We denote by G cs N the set of all cooperative games with a coalition structure and player set N .
If [v; P ] ∈ G cs N and P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m }, the quotient game v P is the cooperative game played by the unions, or, rather, by the set M = {1, 2, . . . , m} of their representatives, as follows:
Unions P r , P s are said to be symmetric in [v; P ] if r, s are symmetric players in v P . By a coalitional value on G cs N we will mean a map g : G Given a value f on G N , a coalitional value of f is a coalitional value g on G
3 The symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalues
The symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue represents a two-step bargaining procedure where, first, the unions are allocated in the quotient game the payoff given by the p-binomial semivalue ψ p and, then, this payoff is efficiently shared within each union according to the Shapley value ϕ.
Definition 3.1 (Carreras and Puente [3] 
for all i ∈ N and [v; P ] ∈ G cs N , where P k ∈ P is the union such that i ∈ P k and Q = r∈R P r . In case p = 1/2, we get Ω 1/2 = Π, the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value introduced by Alonso and Fiestras [1] .
N satisfies the property of balanced contributions within unions if, for all [v; P ] ∈ G cs N , all P k ∈ P and all i, j ∈ P k ,
where P −i is the coalition structure that results when player i leaves the union he belongs to, i.e., P −i = {P 1 , . . . , P k−1 , P k \{i}, P k+1 , . . . , P m , {i}}, and P −j is defined analogously. Notice that in P −i player i does not leave the game, but only union P k .
This property states that the loss (or gain) of a player i ∈ P k when a player j ∈ P k decides to leave the union and remain alone is the same as the loss (or gain) of player j when player i decides to leave the union. It is reminiscent of Myerson's [5] fairness concept.
Let us consider the following properties for a coalitional value g on G 
• symmetry in the quotient game: if P r , P s ∈ P are symmetric in [v; P ] then
• quotient game property:
(this property makes sense only for coalitional values defined for any N ; here and in the sequel we abuse the notation and use a unique symbol g on both G cs N and G cs M ). In the next theorem we give a first characterization of each symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue. We will need a lemma whose proof is straightforward. N that satisfies additivity, the dummy player property, balanced contributions within unions, the coalitional p-binomial total power property and symmetry in the quotient game. It is the symmetric coalitional p-binomial semivalue Ω p . Moreover, Ω p satisfies the quotient game property, is a coalitional value of the p-binomial semivalue ψ p , and yields
Proof : (a) (Existence) It suffices to show that the coalitional value Ω p satisfies the five properties enumerated in the statement. 
Balanced contributions within unions. Let us take [v; P ] ∈ G cs N , with P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m } and M = {1, 2, . . . , m}. Let P k ∈ P and i, j ∈ P k . Then we have
where Q = r∈R P r . We now consider
where P h = P h for h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1, k + 1, . . . , m}, P k = P k \{j}, P m+1 = {j} and M = {1, 2, . . . , m + 1}, and get, in a similar way,
Thus Ω
where
It is easy to check that
Since this expression depends on i in the same way as it depends on j,
4. Coalitional p-binomial total power property. Let [v; P ] ∈ G cs N . Fixing k ∈ M , for every R ⊆ M \{k} we consider the game v R ∈ G P k defined by
The Shapley value gives, for each i ∈ P k ,
Using the efficiency of ϕ, we get
and, finally,
5. Symmetry in the quotient game. It readily follows from the relationship
stated in the previous point, and the anonymity of the p-binomial semivalue ψ p . (b) (Uniqueness) Let g be a coalitional value that satisfies the above five properties. We will see that g is uniquely determined, so that g = Ω p . Using additivity and the fact that the unanimity games form a basis of G N , it suffices to see that g is uniquely determined on each pair of the form [λu T ; P ]. So let λ ∈ R, ∅ = T ⊆ N and P ∈ P (N ). Let R = {k ∈ M : T ∩ P k = ∅} and R k = T ∩ P k for each k ∈ R.
Using the dummy player property it follows that g i [λu T ; P ] = 0 if i / ∈ T . Now we apply the coalitional p-binomial total power property:
It is easy to see that (λu T ) P = λu P T . Then, by the definition of the p-binomial semivalue and its linearity, we have
As, moreover, u 
